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Internet of Things: Evolution and Technologies from a
Security Perspective
Abstract
In recent years, IoT has developed into many areas of life including smart homes,
smart cities, agriculture, offices, and workplaces. Everyday physical items such as
lights, locks and industrial machineries can now be part of the IoT ecosystem. IoT
has redefined the management of critical and non-critical systems with the aim of
making our lives more safe, efficient and comfortable. As a result, IoT technology is
having a huge positive impact on our lives. However, in addition to these positives,
IoT systems have also attracted negative attention from malicious users who aim
to infiltrate weaknesses within IoT systems for their own gain, referred to as cyber
security attacks. By creating an introduction to IoT, this paper seeks to highlight
IoT cyber security vulnerabilities and mitigation techniques to the reader.
The paper is suitable for developers, practitioners, and academics, particularly
from fields such as computer networking, information or communication technol-
ogy or electronics. The paper begins by introducing IoT as the culmination of two
hundred years of evolution within communication technologies. Around 2014, IoT
reached consumers, early products were mostly small closed IoT networks, followed
by large networks such as smart cities, and continuing to evolve into Next Generation
Internet; internet systems which incorporate human values. Following this evolution-
ary introduction, IoT architectures are compared and some of the technologies that
are part of each architectural layer are introduced. Security threats within each
architectural layer and some mitigation strategies are discussed, finally, the paper
concludes with some future developments.
1. Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a network of everyday things, connected together
through the Internet. The function of an IoT system is to monitor the world around
itself, to enable and assist, or to automate a response to changes in the system’s
environment [118, 25]. In comparison, the purpose of an IoT system is to improve
the quality of life by enabling the best response to an environmental change [79] by
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providing responsive services which are specific to the end-users’ needs [88]. An IoT
device can be ‘any thing’ in the world that includes the technological components to
enable the Thing to connect to the Internet through a wired or wireless network. IoT
users can be a human, or machine, or a combination [20]. IoT is not a specific device
or technology, instead, IoT is the inter-working of different technologies enabling the
connectivity of many Things.
Generally, IoT networks comprise of many connected Things connected together
through a management platform. The platform has a number of roles including man-
aging the connected Things, system threats and security, data analysis, processing
and storage, and managing the response of any Things [46]. IoT Things can either
have all of their electronic components included in them at conception, or added
later. Examples of systems where smart functionality is added after conception [81]
include a pet with a tracking tag, external or implanted human biometric systems,
or older high value legacy vehicles such as an aircraft. Smart conceptualised systems
include smart home heating and self-driving vehicles.
2. Evolution of ICT Culminating in IoT
Figure 1 is a time-line showing the evolution of Information Communication
Technologies (ICT) starting from the 1830s, highlighting some of developments and
culminating in IoT. The telegraph is considered as the first major invention of wireless
communication technology. Following this hugely significant invention, comes the
creation of the telephone, closely followed by the birth of computers. The invention
of computers in the 1920s enabled the solving of complex computations, including the
breaking of previously unbreakable codes and calculations including code breaking
at Bletchley Park during WWII. The architecture of this early machine became
the foundation for the computing theory that followed [92]. This led on to the
development of the Personal Computer (PC) in the 1970s, and their unprecedented
uptake in the 1980s. The PC totally revolutionised the lives of individuals in the
home and workplace due its reduction in size and cost, and the addition of new
software such as word processing and spreadsheet tools [75]. Computer technology
has developed relatively slowly over 90 years to the computers we recognise today,
from large powerful servers, to PCs and more versatile mobile computers, including
the laptop, tablet and smart phone.
The next development along the time-line was the networking of computers, in-
cluding US Defence Department project ARPNET, through to the WWW, developed
by Tim Bernes-Lee and launched in 1991 as a tool to share documents. The combi-
nation of the Internet and WWW are the most significant milestone within the IoT
3
Figure 1: Time-line: The Evolution of ICT Culminating in IoT
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time-line. Similar to computers, the Internet has developed relatively slowly, over 50
years from closed connectivity projects to the powerful tools that we all know and
use today.
The release of the Raspberry Pi microcontroller in 2011 was another major IoT
breakthrough and was in-part responsible for the swift uptake of IoT technology.
This low-cost, versatile microcontroller suddenly opened up IoT to hobbyists and
end users. Other microcontrollers did exist, but due its low cost, low complexity
and relatively large processing power and significant amount of free on-line support,
including tutorials, videos, educational DIY websites, blogs and forums, IoT was
no longer limited to commercial projects. The time-line continued onto 2014 when
IoT technology was widely presented to the consumer market by companies like
Google, as they acquired Nest, Apple introducing the Apple Watch, and Siemens
as they introduced SmartThings, an affordable smart home starter kit and software
platform.
Since this consumer introduction, IoT has continued to develop significantly, in-
cluding the creation of more than 400 IoT platforms, many commercial IoT devel-
opers and thousands of products. In 2016, large tech companies including Amazon,
Apple and Google have release voice activated personal assistants. In addition to
consumer IoT, there is Industrial IoT (IIoT) enabling the automation of many in-
dustrial processes. The concept of IoT has also continued to evolve; initially IoT
systems comprised of lots of small closed networks, but this concept has evolved to
incorporate larger more connected networks, for example smart cities with smart
transport infrastructures. But large infrastructure is not the end of this evolutionary
journey, the concept of IoT is currently evolving into the Next Generation Internet
(NGI). NGI is the vision of IoT which seeks to encompass human values within Inter-
net based systems, enabling “human potential, mobility and creativity at the largest
possible scale while dealing responsibly with our natural resources... we shape a
value-centric, human and inclusive Internet for all” [60]. These NGI concepts are be-
ing integrated into existing and new IoT systems through the inclusion of advanced
technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, augmented reality and
virtual reality, are others, whilst “making the future internet more human-centric”.
In many areas, NGI concepts match the smart sustainable city concept, the main
difference is NGI includes human values of well being, rather than just environmental
and economical well-being.
Alongside of this evolutionary journey, in 2016 and 17, there were a number of
very significant security attacks, particularly the Mirai Dyn attack and WannaCry
NHS attack. In response, world wide Governments have begun developing strategies,
initiatives, and in some instances, laws to strive to reduce IoT security vulnerabili-
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ties. Other technologies including Artificial Intelligence (AI), machine learning and
Blockchain are being combined with IoT to produce more powerful tools. Similarly,
Augmented Reality (AR) and Virtual Reality (VR) technology are being combined
to with IoT to create a more interactive user experience.
This evolution of ICT technology, which culminated in IoT has taken 200 years.
In comparison, from the initial concepts of IoT in 1999, through to introduction of
IoT to the consumer around 2014, which has led onto widespread adoption of IoT
technology. The IoT development cycle is just 15-20 years and as a result of this
rapid development, IoT faces major issues, the most significant of which are secu-
rity vulnerabilities. The severity of IoT security vulnerabilities are because security
has been a developmental afterthought. Designers, developers and policy makers
worldwide are now looking for ways to reduce this issue. In 2018 the British Govern-
ment released the world’s first IoT code of practice entitled ‘Secure by Design’ [36].
This code aims to “remove the burden from consumers to securely configure their
devices and instead ensure that strong security is built into IoT devices and services
by design” [35], also the British Government is currently consulting over whether to
mandate security laws for IoT consumer products [37]. Other related methodologies,
strategies and technologies are also being researched and developed [121, 104, 23, 80].
Additionally, the British Government is investing 30.6 million into ‘Security of Digital
Technology as part of the the Periphery’ (SDTaP) research program. This invest-
ment has included the opening in March 2019 of The PETRAS (privacy, ethics,
trust, reliability, acceptability, and security) National Centre of Excellence for IoT
Systems Cybersecurity. The national centre of excellence is a collaboration between
a number of universities, including Imperial College London, Bristol University and
150 industrial partners.
3. Related Work
There is a large number of tutorials, surveys and research studies in the area of
IoT. Significant surveys [16, 5, 77] consider IoT concepts and technologies as a whole,
including the architectures, technologies and principal applications of IoT. Atzori et
al. [17], develops his earlier survey [16], challenging the popular idea that IoT can
be used to solve any issue. Many real IoT smart city deployments are detailed and
analysed, including these works [2, 126, 83].
Further works focus on technologies or challenges within IoT systems, these in-
clude works comparing IoT architectures [127, 85, 5, 125]. Specific communication
technologies [5] are defined and compared. Hejazi et al. [54] compare IoT cloud plat-
forms defining strengths, weakness and where they each fit within the IoT sector.
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Similarly, IoT Operating Systems (OS) are detailed and compared [24, 30]. Bu-
jari [26] considers current challenges including interoperability, security, privacy, and
business models. Security challenges are studied [124, 44, 7] and Alaba [7] surveys
existing security solutions. Stergiou [115] surveys IoT and Cloud Computing from
the perspective of security, Yang et al. [124] and Granjal et al. [47] both study IoT
security vulnerabilities and analyse the effectiveness of security strategies. Gupta et
al. [50, 51] have created a number of security books including a practical and detailed
handbook which surveys security across a range of ICT including wired and wireless
systems, ad-hoc networks, human wearables and cloud computing. The second [51] is
a comprehensive book covering security trends, cyber risk, vulnerability assessments,
the human factor, smart phone protection, critical infrastructure protection. It also
introduces security policies and techniques including cryptography, standards and
modelling.
The contributions of this paper relative to existing literature can be summarised
as this paper is written with:
• Consideration of practitioners and researchers from neighbouring fields.
• A brief history and overview of the evolution of IoT, demonstrating where IoT
sits within ICT and current trends including Industrial IoT, Smart Cities and
Next Generation Internet.
• Consideration of IoT security vulnerabilities.
• Recommendations to reduce security threats.
• Architecture and technologies are considered from the perspective of designing,
developing and securing large Next Generation Internet IoT systems, this in-
cludes quick reference technology comparison tables (Tables Table 1, Table 2,
and Table 3).
4. IoT Technologies
IoT is not a single technology, but a system or framework comprised of many
technologies. This section will begin by considering some definitions of IoT and
then introduce three IoT architectures, before looking in more detail at one specific
architecture, considering the the technologies and security vulnerabilities within each
of its layer. Some security attacks that can be applied to IoT systems including
node capture, eavesdropping, malicious control, IP Spoofing, Ping of death, sniffing,
malicious code injection and denial of service. These attacks will be discussed and
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mitigation techniques suggested. Technologies within IoT systems including Things,
communication technologies, management platforms, data management tools and
user applications will also be introduced.
4.1. Definitions and Concepts
The IEEE has developed two definitions of IoT [87, 56], the first is with respect
to simple IoT networks, and states:
“An IoT is a network that connects uniquely identifiable “things” to the Inter-
net. The “things” have sensing/actuation and potential programmability capabil-
ities. Through the exploitation of unique identification and sensing, information
about the “thing” can be collected and the state of the ‘thing’ can be changed from
anywhere, anytime, by anything.”
The second definition is specific to larger networks, for example smart cities, and
it states:
“Internet of Things envisions a self-configuring, adaptive, complex network that
interconnects ‘things’ to the Internet through the use of standard communication pro-
tocols. The interconnected things have physical or virtual representation in the dig-
ital world, sensing/actuation capability, a programmability feature and are uniquely
identifiable. The representation contains information including the thing’s identity,
status, location or any other business, social or privately relevant information. The
things offer services, with or without human intervention, through the exploitation
of unique identification, data capture and communication, and actuation capability.
The service is exploited through the use of intelligent interfaces and is made available
anywhere, anytime, and for anything taking security into consideration.”
From both of the definitions, a number of characteristics can be highlighted:
1. IoT is a system that incorporates and connects ‘Things’
2. Things sense or monitor their environment
3. Things connect to the Internet to communicate
4. Things are uniquely identifiable
5. The system can potentially compute data, for example use, process, store or
transmit data onward
6. The system should present information to a user or multiple users
7. The system responds to input from connected Things and, or users
.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) do not define IoT,
instead they state some of the characteristics of IoT. These characteristics resemble
the IEEE definitions. NIST state that IoT systems “involve sensing, computing,
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communication, and actuation” [120]. Inline with these definitions [56], and oth-
ers [120, 12, 43, 59, 16, 42, 91, 40, 33], Internet connected enterprise infrastructures,
PCs, laptops, tablets and smart phones will be considered part of IoT.
IoT has use-cases in many areas of life, but in the last few years the focus of IoT
has been moving away from small, independent and unconnected networks towards
more joined-up infrastructures and networks, particularly with a focus on smart
cities. In 2016, the ITU-T SG20 IoT working group changed its name to ‘ITU-
T SG20: Internet of things (IoT) and smart cities and communities (SCC)’. This
group is currently developing 83 smart city standards, each focused on a different
aspect of smart city infrastructure such as architecture [65, 66, 69], data sharing [64]
or security [67, 68]. Similarly, the IEEE P2413 IoT working group has created a
smart city group, IEEE P2413.1. They are currently developing ‘P4213.1 Standard
for a Reference Architecture for Smart City (RASC)’ [13].
The concept of smart cities and sustainable cities have been around since the mid
1990s [70]. Initially, smart cities simply referred to cities with economic improvement
strategies, next the concept included use of ICT within city infrastructures, later the
concept became more citizen centric. Today, most stakeholders would agree that
smart cities include technology in their infrastructures, enabling them to serve their
citizens, providing “more efficient services to citizens, to monitor and optimize exist-
ing infrastructure, to increase collaboration amongst different economic actors and
to encourage innovative business models in both private and public sector” [82].
In addition to the well being of citizens and city infrastructure, the environmental
sustainability of a city’s operations has also become an important feature, “Cities
become smart sustainable when smart ICT is employed for making them (the cities)
more sustainable” [22]. A more recent concept is that of Next Generation Internet, in
combination with smart sustainable cities, resulting in ‘Next Generation Sustainable
Cities’. There are a number of important characteristics of these cities. Firstly, next
generation sustainable cities seek to “shape the future internet as an interoperable
platform ecosystem that embodies the values .... openness, inclusivity, transparency,
privacy, cooperation, and protection of data” [60]. Secondly, next generation sustain-
able cities are ‘next generational’, the technology they are comprised of is developed
based upon the analysis of previous and existing generations of the technology [95].
Thirdly, next generation sustainable cities are built with next generation technolo-
gies, for example, 5G telecommunications, intelligent technologies including machine
learning and AI. Thirdly, NG sustainable cities are are citizen centric, promoting
the health and well-being of all citizen, the city and its environment impact and
sustainability.
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4.2. Architectures
A technical architecture is a framework created to allow designers and devel-
opers to consider the system as a whole and also to break it down into sections.
According to Global Standards 1 (GS1),“a reference architecture is an essential
foundation to enable integrating the diverse technologies into IoT applications” [48].
There are many groups working on developing IoT architectures and other standards.
These groups include IEEE P4213 Working Group, IEEE 802.24 Technical Advisory
Group (TAG), IEEE P4213.1 Working Group, The National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) IoT Working Group, International Standard Organisation
/ International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) 30141 JTC1 IoT Working
Group 10, International Electrotechnical Commission Strategic (IEC) Group8, In-
ternational Telecommunication Union Telecommunication (ITU-T) Group, oneM2M
Consortium, Open Connectivity Foundation (OFC), Industrial Internet Consortium
(IIC), and Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Though currently, none of these
architectures are universally accepted, so below three architectures will be considered
and compared.
Figure 2: IoT architectures: (A) IEEE P4213 Three Layer Architecture [14]. (B) Zhong [127], Miao
Wu [85] and Montagero’s [90] Five Layer Architecture. (C) ITU-T Y.4000 Four Layer Architec-
ture [41].
Historically, the most common IoT architecture is the Three Layer Architec-
ture, illustrated in Figure 2-A. This framework is currently being developed fur-
ther as part of the IEEE P4213 IoT architecture standard [14] which is based on
the SO/IEC/IEEE 42010-2011 systems and software engineering architecture de-
scription standard [63]. The same framework is expanded upon within the IIC’s
industrial internet of things reference architecture [78]. Similar architectures are
discussed [16, 85, 5]. This architecture comprises of the Things, Abstract and Appli-
cation Layers [14, 107, 10]. The IEEE P4213 standard is open source and is a widely
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accepted and supported standard which has been in development for a number of
years, and is still being developed. The standard is very detailed, comprising over
100 pages with the aim of creating an architectural framework which is relevant to
any industry or use case. Though, some researchers [127, 6] suggest the Three Layer
Architecture is too high level and does not allow the different components of the IoT
system to be separated out sufficiently to enable system development or protection.
For the purpose of this paper, considering IoT from a security perspective, the au-
thors agree with this conclusion, that further division of the IoT system will enable
easier consideration of the security vulnerabilities. The next architecture considered
is the ITU-T Y.4000 Overview of the IoT [41]. This standard comprises of a 4 layer
architecture, with separate over-arching management and security capabilities, as
shown in Figure 2-C. Again, for the purpose of this paper, it is more helpful to con-
sider security within each architectural layers, rather than separating security out.
In 2015 a group of researchers, Zhong et al. [127], introduced a Five Layer Architec-
ture comprising of the Perception, Network Access, Network, Application Support
and Application Presentation Layers, illustrated in Figure 2-B. Similarly in 2017,
Montagero et al. [90] and Miao Wu et al. [85] developed an architecture based on
the computer networking Open System Interconnect (OSI) technology architecture.
Montagero et al.’s architecture resembled that developed by Zhong et al. Miao et
al.’s architecture comprised of the same five layers as Zhong et al.’s, plus an addi-
tional Business Layer. From this point forwards, this architecture will be referred to
as Zhong’s Five Layer Architecture
Summary of the Architecture Layers:
1. The lowest layer, commonly referred to as the Perception Layer is the same
across all three architectures and comprises of the physical layer that interfaces
between the physical and information world, monitoring the environment and
collecting data. The layer comprises of hardware devices including sensors and
actuators. In this layer, the collected data is converted into digital data, ready
for transmission up, to the next layer.
2. As can be seen from Figure 2, the Abstract Layer in Model A is subdivided in
Model B and C. The Network Access Layer (Model B) is concerned with moving
the digital data from the perception layer to an access node or gateway. The
data is transmitted using access technologies like Ethernet, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth
or Zigbee. The data is then ready to be used in the Network Layer.
3. The Network Layer (Model B) is concerned with transmitting data received at
the access node throughout the whole IoT network, including the Application
Support Layer and the Application Presentation Layer. These transmission
technologies can include wired and wireless Internet protocols, for example
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HTTP, MQTT and CoAp. In ITU-T’s architecture (Model C), the Transport
Layer is a combination of the Network Access Layer and Network Layer of
Zhong’s architecture (Model B).
4. The Application Support Layer (Model B), also referred to as the Processing
Layer (Model C), is responsible for processing data. Dependant upon the size
of the IoT system, this layer can be very complicated as it is responsible for
processing and combining data from many different sensors and other devices
and presenting it ready for use in the Application Layer. Technologies within
this layer can include management platforms and technologies responsible for
data processing, analysis and storage, this can include cloud technologies.
5. The Application Layer allows the end-user to make use of the collected data.
The layer comprises of tools to develop and manage end-user applications.
These applications are commonly referred to as ‘Apps’ which deliver IoT end-
user services, for example health monitoring tools, smart homes or smart city
applications.
6. Miao Wu et al.’s Architecture differs slightly from Zhong’s Architecture because
it includes an additional layer, the Business Layer. This layer can be considered
as the “manager of the Internet of Things” [85], concerned with business and
profit models, management of data sharing [5], software updates and system
interoperation. This layer is very important and must be considered in the
design and development of an IoT system, particularly within large systems
such as smart cities. Miao Wu et al. explain that the success of a technology
does not only depend on development of the technology, but also the innovation
and development of the business models that manage how the technology will
be used. Based on this point, the Internet of Things may not have long-term
future without the significant development of its business models [85]. This
layer is outside of the scope of this paper.
.
Throughout the rest of the paper, when an architecture is referred to, it is Zhong’s
Architecture, labelled Model B in Figure 2. When considering the movement of data
throughout all of the layers of the architecture, it is important to highlight that data
can move in the opposite direction to that explained above, from the Application
Layer back down to the Perception Layer, enabling actuators to respond to collected
data, system instructions or end-user instructions.
Other well referenced architectures include the oneM2M IoT architecture [117],
cloud centric architecture [49], software stack architecture [113], TCP/IP architec-
ture, OSI reference architecture [85] and Representational State Transfer Services
12
(RESTFUL) architectural style linked to HTTP [72]. Next, the paper will look in
more detail at the technologies that exist within each of layer of Zhong’s architecture.
4.3. IoT Technologies within the Perception Layer
As defined earlier, the end point of an IoT system is the ‘Thing’ that interacts
with itself, other Things or its environment [14]. Generally, the Thing is collecting,
responding data from the physical world or responding to instructions from the IoT
system. The technology in is this layer is shown in Figure 3 and comprises of the
hardware and software components that enable any physical object to act as an IoT
Thing.
Figure 3: Components of an IoT Thing
4.3.1. Sensor & Actuator Unit
Sensors and Actuators are electrical components that connect the real and digital
world by monitoring or responding respectively. Sensors are input components that
monitor environmental characteristics and convert changes in this characteristic into
an electrical signal. The relationship between environmental characteristics and elec-
trical signal outputs can be linear or non-linear, this relationship is defined within
the sensor’s specifications.
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Actuators are output components. They create a physical response to a change
in their electrical input. Generally actuators fall into four categories based on the
nature of their physical response:
• Hydraulic - moving under pressure liquids through a defined space
• Pneumatic - using gas stored under pressure
• Electric - generating electricity
• Mechanical - operating machinery
Similar to sensors, the relationship between electrical signal and actuator output
is defined within its specifications. Generally, IoT sensors and actuators are small
in size, low complexity and low unit cost. In some system, particularly critical
infrastructure systems, higher specification sensors or actuators may be required,
this can increase the cost of these components. Examples of component specifications
include fault tolerance, sensing resolution, sensing rate, response rate, sensing range,
magnitude of response, accuracy, security, storage or processing capabilities. When
designing a system, component specifications and cost are important considerations.
4.3.2. Processing Unit
The processing unit is comprised of hardware and software that manage the
behaviour of the Thing. This unit is commonly a microcontroller; a small, simple,
programmable, self-contained computer on a single integrated circuit comprising of a
processor, ROM, RAM and IO. Some microcontrollers that are commonly used with
IoT projects and have significant amounts of development support.
A microcontroller is usually built and programmed to carry out simple tasks
related to a single simple function, for example, controlling a smart fridge. They can
be built into more complex devices, for example smart phones, then they are referred
to as ‘embedded’. Due to their constrained specifications, microcontrollers can not
run traditional operating systems, instead they use constrained operating systems,
for example mBed, TinyOS or rasbarian [102]. A microcontroller can have additional
memory added to enable it to execute additional processing tasks, for example, to
carry out data processing or data analysis at the sensor to reduce the amount of data
transmitted from the sensor to the IoT network. This is sometimes referred to as
’edge’ analysis. Additionally, the microcontroller can include security features such
as data encryption and endpoint authentication.
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4.3.3. Communication Unit
This unit is responsible for transferring or receiving data. If data is collected at
the sensor, the communication unit will transfer the data to the IoT network. Alter-
natively, if data is received from the IoT network, it will then be acted upon by the
actuator. Communication technologies are considered in more detail in Section 4.4.
Generally microcontrollers have communication unit inbuilt, so when choosing a mi-
crocontroller, the communication and security requirements of the IoT system must
be considered, for example, the desired data transfer rate and transfer distance.
These requirements will also affect which communication technology is most suitable,
for example for a contactless card payment system, the most suitable technology is
Near-Field Communication (NFC) RF technology with a transfer distance of 10cm.
Within the IoT endpoint, communication consumes the largest proportion of power,
therefore the communication technology also affects the power supply requirements.
4.3.4. Power Supply
Endpoint power requirements vary significantly dependant upon the energy re-
quirements of all of the above components. If the Thing is connected to a mains
power supply, the power requirements of the Thing can be considered nearly neg-
ligible in comparison. If the Thing is fixed in one location, for example a smart
fridge, the power supply would generally be wired, for example to the mains power
supply. Often though, IoT endpoints are mobile, meaning a wired power supply
may not be suitable. Instead for mobile endpoints, power could be supplied from a
portable source, for example batteries or a renewable source, for example solar panels
or an energy harvesting unit. According to Andersen, for a wireless IoT system to
be commercially viable, each Thing should have a power supply lifetime of 5 − 10
years [11].
The criticality of an IoT system must be considered when selecting a power
supply. For a highly critical system, for example a warning system within a power
plant, the reliability, redundancy and security of the power supply and its connection
must be considered. In this example, solar power is unlikely to be selected as the
only power supply. Instead, multiple power supplies may be connected via multiple
techniques to provide sufficient confidence.
4.4. IoT Technologies within the Network Access Layer and Network Layer
The movement of data within a network is referred to as communication, sim-
ilarly, terms ‘connect’, ‘transfer’ or ‘transmit’ can be used. Within Zhong et al’s
architecture, the communication of data is be broken into two categories; access
communication technology which sits within the Network Access Layer, and network
15
Figure 4: IoT Short to Medium Range Communication Configurations
communication technology which sits within the Network Layer. Access communi-
cation technologies connect the IoT Thing to the IoT network, usually achieved by
transmitting data from the IoT endpoint to a network access gateway. The net-
work communication technologies transmit data around the rest of the IoT network,
from the access gateway all the way to the Application Layer. These communication
technologies are the where most IoT security vulnerabilities exist. Figure 4 is an
illustration of some short to medium range communication configurations, demon-
strating technologies from the Perception, Network Access Layer and Network Layer.
This illustration is not an exhaustive list of technologies or configurations.
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4.4.1. Access Communication Technologies
Sometimes IoT networks are oversimplified to only include wireless networks, but
this is wrong, IoT networks can be wired too. Wireless networks are commonly used
in hard to reach or hard to install environments, or where wired network installation is
more costly. Conversely, wired networks may be used where the wired infrastructure
already exists, higher data throughput or increased security is required.
Due to power supply restrictions, wireless networks should be designed to have
low power requirements. This means wireless networks are well suited to systems with
short transmission distances and low transfer rates. The choice of which communica-
tion technology and protocol to choose is generally based on the system requirements,
including:
• Wired / wireless
• Data rate
• Data reliability
• Data security
• Proximity of the Thing to receiving node
• Nature of environment
• Ease of access / maintenance
• Number of connected Things
• Number of simultaneously active Things
• Overall system size and complexity
TECHNOLOGIES
Bluetooth Bluetooth
Low En-
ergy
ANT Wi-Fi NFC Zigbee Z-Wave
Range
(m)
100 m 50-100 m 30 m 30-50 m 5-10 cm 10-100 m 30 m
Table 1: Wireless Short to Medium Range Communication Technologies (Continued over page)
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Bwidth
(Hz)
2.4 GHz 2.4 GHz 2.4 GHz 2.4 /
5 GHz
13.6 MHz 2.4 GHz 2.4 GHz
Data
Rate
(bps)
1-
3 Mbps
125 Kbps
- 1 Mbps
12-
60 Kbps
150-
200 Mbps
100-
420 Kbps
250 Kbps 9.6,
40 or
100 Kbps
Battery
Lifetime
0.6 Ah:
Standby:
3 mnth.
Mixed:
5 dy
1 Ah:
Mixed:
1-2 yr.
2xAA:
14 yr
1 Ah:
Mixed:
15 yr
2xAA:
Lis-
tening:
2 dy
Initiator
trf:
15 mAh.
Passive:
0 mAh
2xAA:
Mixed:
5 yr
2xAA:
Mixed:
1 yr
Authenticn Yes ProblematicYes Yes Yes No Yes
Encryptn Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard Based
on IEEE
802.15.1
Bluetooth
4.2
ProprietaryIEEE
802.11
ISO/IEC
14443,
18092
IEEE
802.15.4
Z-Wave
Alliance
Propri-
etary
Scalability Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Topology P2P,
Star (Pi-
conets)
P2P,
Star (Pi-
conets)
P2P,
Star,
Tree,
Mesh
P2P,
Star
P2P Mesh Mesh
No
Nodes
(Mst :
Slv)
8 (1:7),
(200
inactive
slv)
8 (1:7)
(32K
inactive
slv)
65533
(per 8
chan-
nels)
255 2 232 232
Table 1: Wireless Short to Medium Range Communication Technologies [21] [1] [114] [123]
Defining a communication technology typically defines two elements; firstly, the
nature of the transmitted data signal, and secondly the material through which the
signal is transmitted. For example, Ethernet technology comprises of an electrical
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signal transmitted along an Ethernet cable. For Bluetooth technology, an electromag-
netic RF signal is transmitted through air at 2.4GHz. Communication technologies
that do not require a wired medium are referred to as wireless.
Communication protocol refers to the rules that define how the data should be
transmitted, for example, the number of bits in a data packet, which bits are real
data and which are management data. Management data is generally transmitted
as a data header or footer, and used to control the flow of data, including, defining
the destination address, and how the data should travel to the destination.
TECHNOLOGIES
Cellular
3G
Cellular
4G
SigFox LoRa NB-IoT LTE-M
SPECS
Urban
Range
(Km)
5 - 8 km 15 km 3 - 10 km 2 - 5 km 9 km 11 km
Rural
Range
(Km)
50 - 70 km 45 km 30 - 50 km 15 km unavailable unavailable
Transmn
Band-
width
(Hz)
800 MHz -
2.4 GHz
800 MHz -
2.6 GHz
868 MHz 850 MHz -
1 GHz
200 KHz,
700 -
900 MHz
700 -
900 KHz,
1.4 MHz
Data Rate
(Kbits/s)
Mobile:
128,
144 Kbps.
Fixed:
2 Mbs
Mobile: 20
- 100 Mbps
0.3 Kbs 0.3 -
50 Kbs
150 Kbs 64 -
128 Kbs
Power
(mAh)
460 mAh 600 mAh 32 -
51 mAh
40 mAh unavailable 80 mAh
Table 2: Wireless Wide Area Communication Technologies (Continued over page)
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Standards UMTS,
HSPA, W-
CDMA,
WLAN,
WiMAX,
OFDM,
CMDA,
WiMAX,
LTE, LTE
Adv
Proprietary Proprietary SC-
FDMA,
PRACH
OFDM,
PRACH
Uses Messaging,
Internet,
VoIP,
IPTV
Messaging,
Internet,
VoIP,
Games,
Cloud
IoT sys-
tems
IoT sys-
tems
IoT sys-
tems
IoT sys-
tems
Battery
Life
hours -
days
hours -
days
5 - 10 years 10 years >10 years >10 years
Table 2: Wireless Wide Area Communication Technologies [15] [76] [97] [94] [122] [119] [31]
For an IoT network spanning a few meters, across a single building, or collection
of buildings, short to medium-range communication technologies should be selected.
Communication technologies can be categorised based on their network range and
use. These categories include the body area network (BAN), personal area network
(PAN), local area network (LAN) and wide area network (WAN) technologies. BAN
technologies include Ant, PAN technologies include NFC, Bluetooth, Bluetooth Low
Energy, Zigbee and Z-wave. LAN technologies include Wi-Fi and Wi-Fi Low Energy,
additionally Ethernet is a wired LAN technology. Some wireless short to Medium
range technologies are compared in Table 1.
Many IoT systems, particularly larger networks, utilise numerous access commu-
nication technologies to connect multiple Things to the network. For an IoT system
that covers a larger area, for example a Smart City, short and medium-range com-
munication technologies may not be suitable to connect all of the endpoints to the
network [29, 110]. Wired and wireless WAN technologies can be used. Significant
work by Centenaro et al. considers cellular and low power WAN technologies, creat-
ing networks that span 10− 50km in rural areas and 3− 5km in urban areas. Their
work demonstrates these technologies can be suitable for relatively harsh outdoor
environments. Some Wireless WAN communication technologies, including Cellular
(3G and 4G), Sigfox, LoRa, NB-IoT and LTE-M, are compared in Table 2. Other
WAN technologies include Neul, NWave, PLC, Ethernet, Weightless -N, Weightless
-P.
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4.4.2. Network Communication Technologies
Once data is transferred from the Thing to the access node, the data is available
to the Internet to be transported throughout the top three layers of the network
using Internet protocols (IP). HTTP and its secure variant HTTPS are the most well
known IP, but due to large control data overheads ensuring data reliability, HTTP
and HTTPS may not be the most suitable protocols for constrained IoT systems.
So alternative and lighter protocols have been developed that are more suitable
for constrained IoT systems. Examples include Constrained Application Protocol
(CoAP), Advanced Message Queuing Protocol (AMQP), Extensible Messaging and
Presence Protocol (XMPP), Message Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT) and Data
Distribution Service (DDS). Some of these protocols offer security feature similar to
HTTPS.
Platform Focus / Tools Local/
Cloud
Language Cost ($): Free Vs 10,000
Connected Devices
Ayla
Network
E2E. Compatible: AMAP.
Tools: embedded agents,
Phone-as-a-Gateway, ADP
PaaS C, Java Custom pricing
Arm
MBED
IoT
Platform
Compatible: MBED OS. Sup-
port: ARM/ARMcommunity.
Tools: security E2E, easy in-
tegration, open standards
PaaS,
local
OS
C/C++ Custom pricing
AWS IoT E2E. Focus: extreme scala-
bility, many partners. Tools:
recognition registry for
IaaS NET,
Java,
JVM,
Node.
Free: 50 Devices.
Daily: 300 msg, 130
registry actions, 150
exceptions
Things, device SDKs, rules
engine - message evaluation
js,
Python,
Ruby,
PHP
10,000 Devices:
1 KB msg/min =
$560/month [18]
Bosch
IoT Suite
E2E. Focus: cost, lo-
cal&cloud, security. Tools:
analytics, open standards
PaaS,
local
Unknown Custom pricing
Table 3: Enterprise IoT Management Platforms (Continued over page)
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Platform Focus / Tools Local/
Cloud
Language Cost ($): Free Vs 10,000
Connected Devices
Carriots Focus: customer access hier-
achy, easy tool/app integra-
tion. Tools: debug/logs, data
export, SDKs, API design
PaaS Groovy Free: 2 Devices, 500
msg/day, 5 KB/msg
10,000 Devices:
$2/Device (up
to 1 MB/day) =
$20,000/month [28]
Cisco
IoT
Cloud
Connect
Focus: agriculture, customer
relations. Tools: Devices con-
nect through cellular (sim)
network , voice/data connec-
tivity
PaaS Unknown Custom pricing
Datav by
Bsquare
Tools: predict/analyse
issues, automate mainte-
nance/repairs, max utilisa-
tion
PaaS Unknown Custom pricing
General
Electric’s
Predix
Compatible: GE apps,
products, partners. Focus:
healthcare, transport, energy.
Tools: asset digital twin
modelling
PaaS Java,
Ruby,
Node.js,
Python
Custom pricing
Google
Cloud
E2E. Tools: partnerships with
device /app providers, big
data analytics,
IaaS PHP,
Java,
Node.js,
Free: 50 Devices, 2800
msg/day (upto 250 MB,
then charged minutely)
Google’s fast fibre network .Net,
Ruby,
Go,
Python
10,000 Devices:
1 KB msg/min =
$1940/month. [45]
Universal
of Things
HP
Focus: scalability. Tools:
‘market place’ for billing, easy
app design, analytics
PaaS,
local
Unknown Custom pricing
Table 3: Enterprise IoT Management Platforms (Continued over page)
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Platform Focus / Tools Local/
Cloud
Language Cost ($): Free Vs 10,000
Connected Devices
IBM
Wat-
son IoT
Platform
Compatible: IBM Bluemix.
Focus: beginners. Tools:
ADP, security, weather
PaaS Java,
C, C#,
mBed-
C++,
Free: 50 Devices,
1920 msg/day
(100 MB/month)
data, real-time data, signifi-
cant storage
Python,
Node.js/
RED
10,000 Devices:
1 K msg/min =
$421.68/month [55]
Kaa IoT
Platform
Focus: open source, scal-
ability, industry, low R&D
time/cost. Tools: SDKs
PaaS Java, C,
C++
Objec-
tiveC
Free
LTI’s
Mosiac
Focus: oil/gas, security/risk
compliance, manufacturing.
Tools: analytics, insight
PaaS Unknown Custom pricing
Microsoft
Azure
IoT
E2E. Focus: AWS competi-
tor. Tools: rule evaluation en-
gine, device security shadow-
ing, real-time analytics
IaaS C,
Node.js,
Java,
.NET,
Python
Free: 50 Devices, 144
msg/day (8 K/day)
10,000 Devices: (Tier
S3) 1 KB msg/min =
$3726.55/month [86]
Mocana Focus: Military level security
and tools
PaaS Unknown Customised pricing
Oracle
Inte-
gration
Cloud
Focus: manufacturing, lo-
gistics, security, scalability.
Tools: device virtualisation,
big data analytics, fast mes-
saging.
PaaS Java,
Java
Script,
Node.js
10,000 Devices:
from $1.6129/hour =
$1161.28/month [96]
PTC
Thing-
Worx
Focus: fast develop/deploy.
Tools: big data analytics, ma-
chine learning, deployable in
Device/local/cloud
PaaS,
local
C, Java,
.NET,
iOS,
Android
Custom pricing
Table 3: Enterprise IoT Management Platforms (Continued over page)
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Platform Focus / Tools Local/
Cloud
Language Cost ($): Free Vs 10,000
Connected Devices
Salesforce
IoT
Cloud
Focus: capture sales leads,
customer relations. Tools: CS
management, automate: ser-
vice request, repair, feedback
PaaS Rubyon
Rails,
Java,
Node.js,
Python,
$4000/month
Samsung
Artik
Focus: security, easy to use,
optimum system performance
PaaS PHP,
Java,
Swift,
C++
Free: 50 Devices,
72 msg/day (100 K
msg/month)
Cloud Ruby,
Java-
Android,
Python,
C
10,000 Devices:
(Small Business
Tier) 1 msg/min =
$6480/month [105]
Siemens
Mind-
sphere
Focus: cost-effective, open
source based, security. Tools:
machine data, confidential
storage, embedded agents, li-
braries
PaaS Unknown Custom Pricing com-
prised of Connectivity,
Access and Data
Table 3: Enterprise IoT Management Platforms
4.5. IoT Technologies within the Application Support Layer
Device management, data analysis and processing is handled within the appli-
cation support layer. For systems with more than a few connected Things, a man-
agement platform can handle these tasks. In 2017 more than 450 companies offered
IoT Platforms [62]. Platforms can specialise in End-to-End (E2E) solutions, system
security, application enablement, device management, analytics, cloud storage and
back-end connectivity.
A management platform should enable the following actions or services:
• Synchronise with and monitor connected Things
• Control and retrieve data from Things
• Respond to received data
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• Manage system security
• Offer device dashboards to review analytics
Table 3 compares 20 enterprise IoT platforms [111], considering their focus, tools,
development languages, and what IoT system can be developed and operated using
any free allowance, versus the cost to run a system with 10, 000 connected devices.
The cost comparison for a 10, 000 device system includes each device sending a mes-
sage once per minute, but excludes data processing, data analysis, device shadowing,
rule triggering and other actions which can add additional costs. Developers might
need to do further research and testing to determine which platform is best to manage
their network.
4.6. IoT Technologies within the Application Presentation Layer
The technology within the Application Presentation Layer includes the Applica-
tion Development Platform (ADP), which is a tool to enable developers to create
and manage end-user software applications. The end-user applications consume the
data that was collected by connected sensors and processed in the previous layers,
and then present it to the user in a usable format. Some management platforms
considered in Section 4.5 include ADPs, for example ThingWorx, Carriots and Kaa.
Other management platforms interface with specific ADPs, for example IBM’s Wat-
son Management Platform interfaces with IBM’s IoT ADP. Additionally, many man-
agement platforms also integrate with third party ADPs.
The ADP tools are briefly introduced below. A detailed review is carried out by
Ray et al. [101]. Within an ADP, tools can include an Application Programming
Interface (API) and Software Development Kits (SDK). In general terms, an API is
a block of code acting as an interface between two different objects to enable them
to communicate. The API usually comprises of commands, functions and protocols.
Within IoT, an API is the code which acts as a logical connector and translator
between the connected Thing and an end-user software application enabling easy
integration of the Thing into the IoT system and end-user application. Essentially,
the API allows the application to access useful processed data. Generally, APIs are
created by the manufacture of the IoT Thing.
In some literature, the terms API and SDK are used interchangeably, but they are
very different. An SDK is not just code, but instead it is comprised of a whole set of
development tools for example libraries, instruction documentation, APIs, samples of
code and examples of processes. It may also include ADP guides to help a developer
build end-user applications on a specific platform. Additional documentation within
the SDK can include industry or user-specific guides. Comparatively, if an API is
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thought of as a building block, an SDK can be thought of as a complete workshop full
of all of the tools, instructions and building blocks. An API, or multiple APIs can be
part of an SDK. Generally, manufacturers create the initial SDK for an IoT device,
and developers can contribute to the SDK. Developer contributions are particularly
common in an open source environment.
Many ADPs require the developer to be familiar with some programming lan-
guages, for example Node.js, Perl, Python, Java or C. Though some platforms have
been developed to encourage non-technical developers to create end-user Apps. An
example of two such platform include IBM’s IoT platform which uses Node-RED
visual modelling layout tool employing drag-and-drop methods to connect hardware
devices, APIs and on-line services [93]. Secondly, Mendix ADP also uses simple web
and desktop based visual modelling tools [84]. Both platforms state that their tools
reduce development complexity, time and cost.
4.7. IoT Security Throughout the Architecture Layers
Historically, IoT security has been an after-thought, rather than being considered
throughout the design and development of a system. This after-thought approach
has led to huge security problems within IoT networks due to no, or low security in
IoT endpoints, within network gateways, and throughout the communication layers
[103]. These vulnerabilities have led to attacks such as the 2016 Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attack against a small jewellery shop, who were under attack from
more than 25000 IoT cameras. This attack was found and mitigated by security
firm Sucuri [32]. Another very well known example is the Mirai DDoS attack in
2016 [39, 58] which caused Dyn, a large US network provider to temporarily cease
providing IT services to its business customers including Amazon, Twitter, PayPal
and Netflix, and as a result disabling customer websites. During both the Sucuri and
Mirai attacks, hackers used active attack methods [53] to infiltrate a huge number of
no-security, or low-security IoT devices and converted them into remotely controlled
robots, known as botnets. These botnets were then used to look for other low security
IoT devices before all of the botnets were then directed to carry out a DDoS cyber
attack on both the Jewellers and Dyn causing the systems to overload with too
much traffic. In order to understand the security challenges within IoT systems, this
section will consider some common security weaknesses, where the weaknesses sits
within the IoT Architecture [127] shown in Figure 2B, the nature of attacks and a
range of solutions.
Two important definitions are that of passive and active security attacks. A
passive attack can be defined as activity where an unauthorised user, referred to as
an attacker, attempts to read data within a network. This action is passive since the
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attacker does not attempt to make changes to the data. In comparison, an active
attack is when an attacker makes efforts to change data within the network. In both
passive and active attacks, the behaviour is unauthorised and for malicious purposes.
4.7.1. Security within Perception Layer & Network Access Layer
The Perception Layer comprises of the sensors and actuators. The Network Ac-
cess Layer comprises of transmission nodes that allow the access of data into the
IoT gateway. Security attacks within these layers are typically the easiest to exe-
cute and are generally focused on the acquisition of data. The purpose of attacks in
these layers are (1) to snoop on and collect data, (2) to stop sensor from functioning,
which can cause a partial denial of service (3) replace sensor data with false data.
Sensor snooping is generally a passive attacks, for example employing node capture
and eavesdropping techniques [77]. In comparison, active attacks such as hardware
jamming can be applied to stop sensors from functioning, or false data injection [53]
can be used to replace the sensor data with false data, this in turn may affect the
response of the IoT system.
Tools such as Attify can be used to intercept data that is collected by a sensor
and transmitted to its node, or from the node to gateway. The attacker may use
this data for reconnaissance enabling them to learn about the environment that the
sensor is monitoring, or to enable the attacker to perform attacks in other layers of
the network.
Another attack method is hardware jamming. Constrained IoT sensors are partic-
ularly susceptible to this type of attack which can be achieved in two ways; firstly by
remotely injecting the sensor with code or secondly, by physically attaching unau-
thorised hardware to the sensor to jam it. Hardware jamming is applied for two
purposes, to permanently damage the hardware sensor which will reduce or remove
its computational power and stop the sensor from collecting data or converting its
analogue data into digital data, known as actuating. In this way, hardware jamming
can effectively remove sensors from the network, resulting in a sensor DoS. Alterna-
tively, hardware jamming can be used to get vital data such as the cryptographic key
or routing table, or to insert false sensor data into the system to affect the behaviour
of the IoT system.
A sensor battery-depletion attack is another attack method which is similar to
hardware jamming. An attacker can purposely reduce a sensor or actuator’s power
level, enabling the attacker to reduce its computational power, this can affect the sen-
sor or actuator’s ability to function, for example affecting reliable sensing, actuation
or communication [108, 109] enabling an attacker to create a sensor or actuator DoS
or. Alternatively, if a battery-depletion attack is applied to a sensor, the attacker
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can insert false code, which could in turn affect the behaviour of the IoT system.
A relay attack is when an attacker eavesdrops on the communication between
the sensor and its node or node and connected gateway. The compromised data is
then relayed to another system, a victim system, to make the victim system carry
out actions defined by the attacker [99]. Due to the significant growth of constrained
IoT devices, this type of attack is increasing in frequency.
Security techniques and strategies to defend against all of these attacks include
changing default passwords, device/system authentication, strict firewall rules, static
code analysis (SCA) executed within the IoT system or applications and network
intrusion detection mechanisms. Authentication of all connected IoT devices is a
mitigation method used to reduce the likelihood of malicious devices infiltrating the
network. Similarly, safe booting is the technique of checking the integrity of the
different operating system (OS) in connected IoT devices, it uses cryptographic hash
algorithms. For IoT devices with limited power and computation power, WH and
NH cryptographic algorithms are the most appropriate for safe booting [9].
4.7.2. Security within Network Layer
The Network Layer routes data around the IoT network. This layer is embedded
deeper than the Perception and Network Access Layer so infiltrating this layer is
more difficult [73]. Within this layer, the purpose of attacks is to breach the network
to intercept the data within it, this is generally done with active attacks [53] and can
include gateway attacks, Man-in-the-Middle, ARP cache poisoning, ICMP attacks,
Ping of death, Pong attacks and IP spoofing [57, 52].
A gateway attack is similar to a relay attack applied in the perception layer, it can
be used to block the connection between the sensors and the internet infrastructure,
thus deleting sensor data or redirecting the sensor data, causing damage to the system
and causing a DoS [100]. A Man-in-the-Middle attack is widely used to secretly
intercept system data and then alter this data, giving the attacker the ability to
capture and manipulate data in real time [34]. A sinkhole attack is related to a Man-
in-the-middle attack, the attacker employs a vulnerability within the network layer
to cause the dropping of delivery packets, thus preventing the packets from reaching
their destination. These dropped packets can then be destroyed or redirected to a
different destination which is harmful in an IoT environment resulting in a system
wide DoS.
In addition to the interception attacks above, malicious control of this layer can
enable sophisticated attacks on services within the next layers the Application Sup-
port Layer and the Application Layer, including attacking end-user services or ap-
plications.
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Security techniques to mitigate these attacks include using firewall rules to insti-
gate device white and black lists, enabling randomized algorithms for TCP sequence
numbers, using short time to live (TTL) durations for the DNS cache, blocking appli-
cations with weak authentication features or forged packet discovery mechanisms [57].
Secure routing is the technique of routing data via multiple paths securely, this can
which reduces the error exposure and acts as a network mitigation technique.
4.7.3. Security within Application Support Layer
The Application Support Layer is the brains of the IoT network because it is
responsible for the management of devices and data. Many of the attacks within this
layer are as a result of security attacks in the lower layers, also attacks not related
to the layers below are sometimes similar in nature to the attacks described in lower
layers, but some attacks are also independent of other layers. This layer is vulnerable
to a broad range of attacks, including sniffing, malicious code injection [116] and
particularly denial of service.
Denial of service is the most common attack here due to the significant number
of network resources being used in this layer. This means there are many different
types of DoS attacks that can be applied to prevent genuine users from being able
to access IoT devices, the complete system or specific applications. DoS attacks
typically occur by the attacker flooding a victim device, or multiple victim devices,
with redundant requests or null sessions, making it impossible for genuine users to
access the victim device, just like the famous Mirai attack [98].
This layer is also known to be vulnerable to malicious insider attacks which are
performed by an authorised system user who tries to access information from other
users or other devices in the IoT network [106]. Once the insider has access to other
user accounts or devices, they can carry out unauthorised actions, for example issue
unauthorised commands or access system credentials and vital system information,
thus enabling the malicious insider to carry out more higher level attacks.
The Application Support Layer contains many of the shared resources, for exam-
ple routing tables which can serve as an attack vector for attackers to observe shared
resources and get the required information to enable them to carry out attacks on
other areas of the IoT system. Similarly, third-party tools such as a Platform as
a Service (PaaS) based management platform, or cloud computing data process-
ing tools, they provide a third-party web service component which can be used by
attackers to breach the IoT environment remotely.
Malware attacks are executed in this layer. Malware is a security program which
is secretly placed inside a network to monitor the traffic without the system admin-
istrator being aware of it presence. There are a number of different techniques that
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an attacker can use to install malware, including phishing emails, but once malware
is in place, the data it collects generally enables further higher level attacks.
Many of these different attacks can be mitigated by enforcing robust security
features such as strong authentication, intrusion detection mechanisms, traffic en-
cryption and regularly checking that all of the technologies within the system have
up-to-date software, and particularly that patches are applied where required [89].
Data fragmentation is also useful as a mitigation technique in which data within
this layer can be split into various fragments and stored on different servers or other
system locations, thereby reducing the risk of data theft, or rendering the theft as
useless [112]. The hyper-safe lock-down of the write memory files and device boot-up
and configuration files mitigates against the unauthorised customisation of the files
that control the behavior of the IoT system. This lock-down is achieved by using
point indexing which constrains changes in data into the pointer indexes [74]. When
all of these measures are implemented and regularly checked, this should act as a
good security barrier against external attacks.
4.7.4. Security within Application Layer
The Application Layer manages the user applications and provides services from
the rest of the IoT system to the user applications. It is through these applications
that an IoT system interacts with its users. These applications include smart home
systems, smart healthcare, smart tracking and logistics, and smart city infrastruc-
tures and applications, to name a few. All of the services provided by this layer
are dependent on the data actuated from sensors, communicated by the Network
Layer, and, managed and processed by the Application Support Layer. Lots of data
is handled by this layer, so vulnerabilities and threats exist from both within the
IoT system and from the applications. Most of these threats are focused on manipu-
lating the IoT application for the attacker‘s purposes. Many of the attacks that can
be experienced in the previous layers can occur in this layer, but in addition to the
previous attacks, there are also client-side application attacks.
Cross Site Scripting (XSS) is an injection attack during which attackers insert
a client-side script such as java script to modify the application‘s web interface,
enabling the attacker to trigger unwanted behavior and actions in the application, for
example the attacker has the ability to completely change the content and behaviour
of the user application [8].
A malicious code attack [53] is another attack vector used by attackers to disrupt
the services provided by the application layer. It is sent by an attacker and can
sometimes be executed by itself or triggered by the victim through another medium,
for example through a phishing emails. The purpose of this attack can be to change
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the data within a user application or to gain application credentials or other vital
system information.
Intentional data loss is a vulnerability that can affect the application layer. Due to
the large amount of data transmitted between the devices, an attacker can orchestrate
a disruption in the network which can lead to data loss. In these circumstances, low-
cost sensors and actuators are most affected as they generally do not have storage,
error checking or redundancy features due to their constrained nature.
Another kind of phishing attack is prevalent in this layer. The attack is dis-
tributed through infected user emails with the purpose of tricking a victim into
revealing their login credentials, or to tricking the application into accepted spoofed
user credentials.
Many of the attacks experienced within the Application Layer occur due to non-
standard application code which is written by the application programmer. Gen-
erally application programmers are concerned with application functionality rather
than security, therefore secure coding techniques may not be employed. This non-
standard code increases application vulnerabilities allowing malicious attackers to
take advantage and cause damage to the IoT system.
The majority of these attacks can be mitigated with ‘user validation’ using in-
tegrity and encryption mechanisms to authenticate user interactions. The use of
system anti-virus, firewalls and anti-malware programs are crucial. Finally, incom-
ing and outgoing network traffic can be monitored, also, for a large scale IoT system,
all of the sensor and actuator connections within the system can be monitored. All of
these interactions can be monitored using systems such as a Network Intrusion De-
tection (NID) system. For most networks and IoT systems there are ‘normal traffic’
patterns, and the NID system can be trained to recognise normal traffic and detect
outliers or anomalies.
5. Future Developments
As discussed throughout this paper, IoT can be used to target challenges and
improve quality of life. In the opinion of the authors, one of the largest international
challenges that we face today is this that of reducing energy consumption. Energy
has become a very important human commodity. Yet, it is widely recognised that
our main energy resources, that of coal, gas and oil are limited. So, there is the need
to find alternative sustainable energy resources and to reduce energy consumption.
Instead though, Worldwide, energy consumption is currently increasing, particularly
in the world’s emerging markets. Since the 1970s Asia and Africa’s energy demands
have increased approximately 7 fold [61]. In addition to these factors, at present,
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“most people spend 90% of their daily lives indoors relying on mechanical heating and
air conditioning, thus leading to buildings becoming the largest energy consumers
worldwide” [27]. Within the US and the EU, buildings account for a staggering 40%
of all of the energy that is consumed this those regions.
Existing Building Energy Management Systems (BEMS) generally measure and
monitor energy usage. Some systems also offer automated control of the Heating,
Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Systems. These BEMS have been demon-
strated to reduce energy consumption by up to 30%. An area of further future
development of IoT technology is within advanced BEMS using the concepts of Next
Generation Internet, to achieve further energy reductions of 30−40% [19]. Such sys-
tems could include additional control, for example to automate opening or closing
of windows, doors and other building assets, control of appliances or machinery, for
example, turning off domestic appliances when energy consumption passes a usage
threshold, or turning industrial machinery from ‘stand-by’ to ‘off’ outside work-
ing hours. Developments could also include data fusion techniques [3] to combine
different IoT data sets, including weather data, zoned heating linked to room occu-
pancy [38, 71], or lighting systems which respond to external daylight conditions [27].
Such system could manage windows and blinds causing windows to tilt slightly to
reflect away sunlight during warm conditions, or blinds to open fully to make op-
timal use of external light conditions. Also, the consideration of the people using
these buildings; their comfort and their building interaction expectations [4] AI, ma-
chine learning and gamification techniques could be employed to make these systems
more intelligent, human-centric and energy conscience, allowing us to reduce energy
consumption further. AI and machine learning are methods of increasing system
intelligence, including human ethics and improving user experience. Gamification is
the mechanics of gaming, applied in a real-life context to improve a user’s experience
of a system and increase their engagement with it.
Many different and often unrelated IoT BEMS are currently being developed, but
future developments that focus on user engagement by including system resilience,
delivering sustainability and combining more of these different techniques are most
likely to result in consumer and industrial uptake, enabling ae significant reduction
in energy consumption within buildings, which will in turn result in a significant
reduction in worldwide energy consumption.
6. Conclusion
This paper seeks to be an introduction, overview, and reference guide for IoT
systems, particularly considering security issues. Within this paper the authors
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demonstrate that IoT is the culmination of advances within computing, communi-
cation technologies and the Internet, all combined with the human drive to improve
our quality of life. Next, IoT architectures and technologies are introduced includ-
ing a number of quick reference technology comparison tables. Following this, the
significant IoT security vulnerabilities, which have appeared as a result of the rapid
development of IoT are described and some mitigation techniques are discussed.
Finally, a future area of development is introduced.
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